Post GE 2011 Analysis – Part Four: People’s Action Party

Pre GE

The PAP turned the heat on itself in this election by making many missteps. Apart from its refusal to apologies for among the many issues the flood in Orchard Road, the escape of Mas Selemat, the influx of foreigners, housing woes, DPM Teo Chee Hean announcement another salary hike for civil servants and political office holders just before the elections.

The PAP was the first party to unveil its new candidates, perhaps familiarity bred contempt, but there was little about the new candidates that took people’s breath away. Some of the new candidates seemed to have little proper life experience despite their academic credentials (or may due to them) that Singaporeans could find nothing to be impressed with, Vikram Nair’s main discontent was in finishing close to the bottom of class in Secondary 2 because of computer games, Steve Tan’s biggest disappointment was in getting retained in JC1, Tin Pei Ling’s greatest regret was not bringing her living mother to the Integrated Resorts, Dr Janil Puthucheary found that he had no issue with the Internal Security Act that saw his father locked up in the 1960s… Poor PR training caused these new PAP candidates to be scoffed at before the campaign even began. Not all the new candidates came out of the unveiling session with eggs on their faces, some candidates such as Zainal Sapari and Dr Intan Azura Mokhtar performed well. Current education minister Heng Swee Keat was probably the most qualified of the group with his past experience in charge of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, and the new candidate to look like he could be made a minister soon. He was however to be overshadowed by 4 people, MG(NS) Chan “of-the-Lanfang-Republic” Chun Sing, Dr Janil “I-did-NS-I-saved-babies-lives” Puthucheary, Foo “allegations-I-will-not-respond-too” Mee Har and Tin “I-don’t-know-what-to-say” Pei Ling.

Chan came into the fray with much fanfare, he was the highest ranking Armed Forces officer ever to leave the uniformed service to enter politics but his public performance let him down. His first mistake was when he responded to a reporter about the oppositions bid to re-evaluate the duration of conscription, he responded in a tone that spoke down to the reporter and by extension the people in a manner reminiscent of the usual PAP style without even being an MP let alone a minister. It expectedly draw a rather bad reaction from the ground. His next mistake was in a speech he made to his PAP cadres about the obscure nations of Lanfang in Sumatra and tried to draw inferences between why it failed and how voting opposition was akin to the Lanfang Republic’s failure; firstly he deemed it proper to speak like an uneducated hooligan despite his educational background which (to many) showed a distinct lack of respect for the people around him, secondly he got his facts wrong. He then said that he would ‘mobilise’ the people of Buona Vista ward to support the campaign of their former MP Lim Swee Say in East Coast GRC, if his own GRC was not contested – old habits die hard. These presumably did not endear him to voters, especially netizens.

The litany of complaints against Tin, Foo and Puthucheary do not need to be rehearsed all over again. Suffice to say, they did not do the PAP any good in the public eye, they did not even win sympathy votes.

But the new candidates cannot be made to bear the brunt of the fault for the PAP. The senior members of the party too must share much of the responsibility. The party’s policy problems and practical failures aside, the senior members said conflicting things that only served to confuse their campaign. They were campaigning as if theyeach had an individual agenda to discredit the other. Tharman Shanmugaratnam said in a national forum that it was good for Singapore to have an opposition, Lee Hsien Loong replied in an NUS forum that Singapore could not have 2 A teams & a 2 party system; Goh Chok Tong then contradicted both when he said that there were so many ministers that each might only serve 2 terms in office, he was refuted by Wong Kan Seng who implied that it was only Goh’s wishful thinking. Lee then said that his father, then-Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew was irreplaceable and that there would not be another MM, to the public it was a not so oblique hint to the Senior Minister.

Then-party chairman Lim Boon Heng tried to outdo them all when he cried while introducing a batch of candidates insisting that the cabinet did not engage in groupthink. As if on cue, Vivian Balakrishnan and Lim Swee Say came out to agree with him that there was no group think in parliament. Irony?

Lim Hwee Hua attempted to top the rest when she decried the fact that Tin Pei Ling and Foo Mee Har was the target of online abuse because of their gender.

The PAP was fighting an uphill battle against an increasingly influential online media. It should come as no surprise that the online media is biased to the non-PAP parties since people turn online only because they cannot find a voice off it. And the PAP was not ready for it. Every misstep and mistake was woefully shown up, every argument dismantled and every act seen through eyes of cynicism. There was no rational way for it to engage the new media, rather there seemed to be ‘online trolls’ going around and engaging in slamming other parties. It was a truly a catch 21 proposition, the PAP needed the online media to be receptive to it online, the online media can only be receptive if the PAP is not online.

Long story short, the PAP candidates did themselves no favours with the electorate, unlike in the years past when they ran a tight ship with a singular propaganda person (S Rajaratnam) leading the way. The phrase too many cooks spoil the broth seems like an appropriate term to describe the PAP’s pre-campaign effort.

GE 2011

Nomination day began ominously enough with the official pull out of Steve Tan over possibly damaging allegations during his tenure in NTUC, and the eleventh hour appearance of Dr Chia Shi Lu as its candidate in Tanjong Pagar GRC. This gave Singaporeans more grounds to condemn the GRC system, when asked by the media why the PAP had not earlier fielded Dr Chia, and then MM Lee replied that the PAP had tested Dr Chia, he was a President’s scholar and the reason he was not fielded was because he did not have enough people experience.

Attacking other parties to destroy their credibility has been part of the PAP playbook right from the days of the Barisan Socialis, and it has always worked because the opposition candidates chosen either self-destructed in the face of criticism or were truly as the PAP had alleged them to be. This elections though was different; the PAP had aimed their guns at Chen Show Mao, but were frustrated in their attempts to attack him because he was not central to the WP campaign; unlike previous elections when there was one key candidate of GRC (Eunos GRC/Dr Lee Siow Choh 1991, Tang Liang Hong 1997, Chee Soon Juan 2001, James Gomez 2006) to train at, this time round there were too many spread all around and it did not make sense for any of the ministers to attack another person’s challenger and neglect their own.

Unlike past elections, it was not the PAP who set the agenda, but rather the WP’s clarion call of voting in a first world parliament, Singaporeans were voting to secure their future together by moving towards a first world parliament. Without a central target to attack the opposition with, the PAP ended up targeting the WP’s election slogan; it was target led by law minister K Shanmugam and deputy speaker Indranee Rajah, and later Goh Chok Tong. The concept of a first world parliament may have been debatable but the PAP’s mistake was in attacking the WP for not giving examples, forgetting that the PAP itself did this with the GRC system and the Elected Presidency.

The PAP had to defend Tin Pei Ling from attacks from all sides, with SM Goh asking the electorate to give her chance and let her learn on the job and improve. It is a wonder that the opposition did not take advantage of that comment and ask Singaporeans to give them a chance and let them hit the ground running.

The campaign was also remembered for the remarks by then MM Lee Kuan Yew that Singaporean youths were a footloose generation and that voters in Aljunied GRC would have “5 years to repent and regret” if they voted in the PAP. PAP Secretary General Lee Hsien Loong staved off an even larger electoral embarrassment by his eleventh hour apology for the past actions of the PAP and elder Lee’s comments. Mr Lee’s comments together with his points in his book Hard Truths Malay integration definitely caused the PAP to lose a substantial number of votes.

It should come as no surprise that the minister’s that did the best were the ones who said the least and had the least controversies upfront, Lim Hng Khiang, Tharman, Gan Kim Yong, Khaw Boon Wan and K Shanmugam. These were also the ministers whose wards were mostly in the west of Singapore. Former foreign minister George Yeo was arguably the most popular PAP minister of the cabinet and yet he lost to a strong WP team, perhaps it was not so much their popularity as the quality of opposition contesting their seats.

PM Lee Hsien Loong attempted to connect with the public via Facebook chat. It recieved high marks for effort, low marks for implementation. The Prime Minister was simply overloaded with comments such that the effort could have seemed insincere to many. The deluge should have been expected but somehow the forum used was not set up to cope with it. In fact, it would seem that many people “Liked” the PAP Facebook page mere to post comments and then un-”Like” the page again. PM Lee came out of the campaign with alot of credit, because his actions did help the PAP stave off further loses. What he could do in the future would be to set up a public Facebook page and find some time maybe in the evenings to have  regular MPSs online. If sustained in a sincere and decorous manner, this can do more good for the PAP then any newspaper article could.

Post GE

MM Lee Kuan Yew and SM Goh Chok Tong shocked Singaporeans and the world when they announced their retirement from cabinet, to which some local commentators claimed that this showed that PM Lee Hsien Loong was clearly in charge. Rebuttals and analysis on this point has been made so many times by other commentators that little has to be rehashed. PM Lee Hsien Loong than surprised the Singaporean public by appointing fresh MPs Heng Swee Keat and Chan Chun Sing as Minister and Acting Minister respectively, and convened a committee to re-evaluate political salaries.

Dr Lim Wee Kiat (Canberra, Sembawang GRC), Irene Ng (Tampines-Changkat, Tampines GRC), Inderjit Singh (Kebun Bahru, Ang Mo Kio GRC) all made in quick succession comments that can be charitably described as PR-challenged and ended up getting flamed on the internet. Tin Pei Ling (Macpherson, Marine Parade GRC) can do no right in the public eye regardless what she does[1], Tin is now the classic case of “damned if you do damned if you don’t” she probably would do a better job not doing anything.

PAP ministers are now taking actions that they otherwise would not do, new transport supremo Lui Tuck Yew has been going around on public transport, national development czar Khaw Boon Wan has announced that the salary ceiling for applicants for a HDB flat would go up and is reviewing how to build BTO flats in mature estates; education minister Heng See Keat has made an open call to the public for feedback. Most of the calls from the ministers have either been received with caution or scepticism. Many Singaporeans seem to be waiting to see if the trust that the PAP had lost with them can be sustained.

Commentary

It is part of the incumbency effect that it is easier to retain a seat, but it is also easier to have the blame attributed to you. Simply put, the PAP can do nothing right in the eyes of the public. The current PAP seems to be going on its past reputation of bringing Singapore for a third world port city into a first world metropolis, forgetting that its earlier ministers are not its current ministers, and neither are its MPs the same. If it continues to risk its political mileage but keeping the status quo, it is only guaranteed to lose more seats in the next elections.

The mess of comments early on served to lead Singaporeans to a confluence of confusion. What exactly was the PAP’s message this election? The PAP would do well to go back to its early days and run its ship tightly. Take orders from one propaganda huncho and drop the mixed metaphors and conflated analogies, return to that one core message at every election.

A look at the complaints against the PAP would show that much revolves around the political salaries that it pays itself. PM Lee Hsien Loong seems to have either realised this or accepted the truth of it after the elections and has now taken steps to defuse the tension. The work of the committee will determine how much lost ground the PAP can recapture, or if it loses more. Indeed as Assoc Prof Cherian George of the Wee Kim Wee School of Communications (in Nanyang Technological University) says the opposition’s greatest fear should be that the PAP learns its lesson too well. Unlike Assoc Prof George, this writer would not agree so much that the opposition has much to fear going by the nuances of what the PAP MPs and ministers have said in this last month. It seems that many of the PAP MPs and ministers still believe firmly in the correctness of all their policies and trust that changing the delivery is all that is needed for them. A renewed humility must pervade the PAP if it wants to stem the outflow of votes from it. The electorate is not as uneducated and pliable as in previous years, in fact with new media the electorate is more vocal and will become increasingly so. Among the many Singaporeans not in parliament are so many successful people and specialist in so many fields that the PAP must accept that it does not have a monopoly of talent. If it continues to ram things down the throats of the people, the PAP will find an alternative elite, the beginnings of which have begun to show up, rising up and challenging it. This threat is very real, this election has shown that the upper middle class and above have no qualms giving their votes to the opposition if it is intelligent and credible (PAPs biggest loses in Holland-Bukit Timah GRC were in Bukit Timah district, in Aljunied GRC it was Serangoon district, Joo Chiat came close to swinging to the WP, a similar trend too in most parts of Singapore). Ironic as it sounds the ground that benefits the most is most comfortable kicking out the current government, while the group that loses the most doesn’t. It’s not very hard for the former group to end up joining the other parties.

Can the PAP ministers, MPs and grassroots humble themselves? Only time will tell.

The PAP in the years leading up to the election had shown itself too detached from the ground to know what was going on. When otherwise nonchalant youths challenged the PAP on growing disenchantment over national service the PAP ministers could only say that if it was happening that was a problem. When Singaporeans complained over the influx of foreigners taking away jobs Singaporeans want to do, the PAP ministers countered that without these foreigners Singapore’s buildings would not be built (jobs that Singaporeans never wanted in the first place). The best solution for the PAP ministers to win back the ground would be to do without their grassroots leaders and go down to the ground on their own to find out what really was going on.

The PAP has lost the ground, but it can win it back, if it changes. To win it back will require guts and character that will test the PAP in the years to come. The biggest enemy for the PAP is itself, can it change? Only time will tell.


[1] Tin wrote a letter to the residents of her Macpherson ward introducing herself and where her Meet-the-People session would be, and ended up getting flamed on the internet – waste of taxpayers’ money to print coloured flyers, girlish font, bad design, could have just put up the letter at the area under the void deck. One would reckon that if she had put the letter at the void deck, she would be lambasted for insincerity in engaging the residents.

Post GE 2011 Analysis – Part Three: National Solidarity Party & Singapore People’s Party

National Solidarity Party

Pre GE

No one expected the NSP to field as many candidates as it did, certainly not 24 candidates. But it had a superb chance of entering parliament especially after it managed to recruit some outstanding candidates in Hazel Poa, Tony Tan and Jeannette Chong-Aruldoss, and was contesting in seats with extremely unpopular Ministers such as Tampines led by Mah Bow Tan. Together with the goodwill it built up when it announced the setting up of a Malay Affairs Bureau, the NSP could have been considered the dark horse of the coming elections.

Regrettably, it used up its reservoir of goodwill as soon as it began amassing it.  The first hints of electoral disappointment came when the NSP held a press conference to introduce their new ‘catch’ from the Reform Party. There were hints of the alliance as a marriage of convenience between the 2 groups, with the Tan couple leading one group and Goh leading another. The NSP did not endear itself to voters when it played a game of tough ball with the other parties, most notably the RP and WP, especially in fighting for Moulmein-Kallang GRC and Pioneer SMC. It made numerous strategic errors by announcing its candidates early only to see them moved from Moulmein-Kallange GRC to Chua Chu Kang GRC. Publically challenging the WP which was the most well liked opposition party was also not a strategic move on its part. In the NSPs defence, stories have emerged online (if one would believe them) that the whole public dispute with WP was a way to throw the PAP off-guard.

Chairman Sebastian Teo performed well in a public debate to restore confidence in the parties seriousness, however his performance was in mandarin, and only served to shore up the impression that the party was made up of male Chinese businessman who were otherwise not connected with the ground. This may not be true, but perceptions are hard to change.

GE 2011

What was apparent after Nomination Day was that each team was conducting its own election with little or no central co-ordination. The campaign that Jeanette Chong-Aruldoss ran in Mountbatten SMC was essentially a different campaign from the one run by Yip Yew Weng in Radin Mas SMC, Ken Sun in Whampoa SMC and Steve Chia in Pioneer SMC. The same could be said of the GRCs

Nicole Seah emerged as the key public face of the party, she entered the fray after the public lashing of Tin Pei Ling as a candidate for the party and to her credit took advantage of the similarities between herself and Tin to show herself as the better representative of the youth. She amassed in a short time a cult of personality around herself most expressly by the 100,000 Likes on her public Facebook page. Her campaign was grounded in showmanship, she was the face of the party while the rest like Goh Meng Seng, Tony Tan, Hazel Poa and Jeannette Chong-Aruldoss were the brains in the party. Her antics were befitting of a person in the advertising industry – she knew how to catch the audience – and in her the NSP has found a PR manager that could help them into parliament in the next election.

There was a minor distraction when allegations about misconduct were alleged against Spencer Ng of the Marine Parade team, but once again as in the SDP experience, the issue never blew up.

Goh Meng Seng’s biggest mistake was in fielding the team he did in Tampines. This is no disrespect to the persons fielded in the team, only that they were nowhere near as high profile as some others in the party. Unlike the WP which used a team ranking approach – essentially putting their chips in one GRC team, the NSP split their best chips all over the island. Such was public disaffection with the helming minister that even without the most high profile candidates the team managed a credible 42% of the popular vote, it can only be left to the imagination what would have happened had some of the NSPs stronger (i.e. more well-known and popular) candidates been fielded in Tampines.

What about the minister-specific tactic? It is apparent that the minister-specific tactic is not sustainable in the long run, what if like George Yeo, there is no specific policy to attack the minister with? Regardless, what can be said is that the minster specific tactic did not succeed. Considering that housing was a key issue for the large majority of the electorate, a successful campaign should have seen the minister lose his seat in Tampines, this was not to be. Did then SM Goh Chok Tong lose votes because of his policies  or because of his comments during the election and the presence of Tin Pei Ling and Nicole Seah? A ministry/minister specific strategy was really a way to mask the lack of a common party platform for the NSP, a problem that the NSP would do well to address. A minister/ministry specific strategy was also a vote loser – why would a civil servant want to vote for a party which criticises ministry policy (in the image of the minister), is that not asking the civil servant to slap himself? Anybody would turn defensive if their work was challenged publicly even if they knew they felt their work to be wrong.

Post GE

The only piece of news that has come out about the NSP since the elections was the soliciting for donations by its Marine Parade team especially Nicole Seah, this has caused the cult of personality around her to diminish somewhat. If one googles the NSP website, one would find that little has been done since the elections, in fact the website is still its GE 2011 version, most of its outreach has been on Facebook.

Some of its candidates are continuing on their public walkabouts, most visibly Nicole Seah and Jeanette Chong-Aruldoss. Much of the publicity has been on the Facebook accounts of these candidates. This increases the profile of the candidates to the benefit of the individual but without improving the NSP brand it will come to naught. This was the exact problem that the SPP faced (more on this later). NSP needs to find ways to grow its image as a party and not merely a vehicle for people interested in running for office. NSP cannot just be a political charity and a party with heart (this is no diminishment of their obvious sincerity in serving) but must improve its hard credentials especially what it stands as embodied in a party ideology (see commentary).

Commentary

The NSPs greatest strength is also its greatest flaw. It is a broad church that accepts people of all strips, but it has no fixed policy, no ideology to identify itself with. The WP has a very clear idea of a “First World Parliament” and the blue of the working class to identify with – a sort of democratic socialism; SDP has its intense focus on rights and freedoms to identify with – a sort of liberalism, but the NSP does not have anything that people will associate it with (apart from Nicole Seah). It seems to have allowed people with their own agenda to enter into it and run on its ticket, this is a good means of building a party and increasing its size rapidly, but it is not sustainable in the long run if the NSP harbours the intention of entering office as government one day (although this is not what it claims to want to do in its party manifesto).

The official party ideology is that it is “democratic, pragmatic and progressive” party that treasures national values and works towards a society for all. While democratic is understandable what exactly does the term pragmatic and progressive mean in terms of a party ideology? Progressivism is a political attitude, but progressive to what end in what direction? Pragmatic by what barometer? How does one be pragmatic and treasure national values – especially if the situation arises when national values are not pragmatic (e.g. comunalism is pragmatic for entering parliament, but it is not a national value). The cynic would say that it means the party has no ideology but moves with the wind, that it wants to be all things to all man but will end us as nothing to every man. This is perhaps the biggest challenge the NSP faces, how does it differentiate itself from the PAP, WP and SDP without losing the majority of voters? Too close to either and it would be better off joining them, too far from the ground and it would be better of becoming a social charity.

The NSP was also the best case study into the rationality and discernment of the Singapore electorate. Its spread of votes was the largest and it showed that Singaporeans were willing to give credible candidates a chance. Credible by whose measure, one might ask. Credible by the measure the PAP has put forth – educated, and generally successful in their work. Purist would challenge that the PAP’s measure of educated is not the only measure, that is true, but it is the yardstick by which Singaporeans have been brought up to think of as the right one. Any serious party, with ambitions of entering parliament and becoming government would do well to take heed of this. Credible candidates such as Jeannette Chong-Aruldoss did well; well less credible ones such as Ken Sun, Yip Yew Weng and Steve Chia did not do as well. Marine Parade did well partly because Nicole Seah was seen as a more credible candidate than Tin Pei Ling. In contrast, NSP’s Jurong GRC team suffered a trouncing because its candidates were nowhere near as credible as the slate that the PAP had, especially with Tharman Shanmugaratnam and Halimah Yaccob in the lineup.

There have been recent talks of a loose NSP-SDP alliance, this might be possible and it could even be brokered by the Alex Tok and Tony Tan since they were both colleagues previously in the Reform Party. The problems existent in both parties would be smoothed over since the SDP and NSP have complementary strengths, but the lack of an ideology means that NSP would have more to lose in joining hands with the SDP since it has nothing to fall back on should the venture not work out, here a clear party ideology is imperative. Other problems exist too, using NSPs pragmaticism the first problem that would appear is that it is not pragmatic to be liberal, definitely not in getting into parliament.

Singapore People’s Party

Pre GE

The SPP was originally a component of the SDA but left the SDA after a public run-in with the other members of the SDA such as Desmond Lim and PKMS. The SPP brand was more of the Chiam See Tong brand, it was not the party that carried the candidate but the candidate that carried the party.

Chiam See Tong, true to his ability to sense the ground had stated his intention to leave Potong Pasir SMC and challenge then Deputy Prime Minister Wong Kan Seng in Bishan-Toa Payoh GRC. Chiam had smelled blood seeing as Wong was reeling from the public anger of his mishandling of the Mas Selamat Affair and his colleague then education minister Ng Eng Hen had made numerous mistakes in the education ministry including the bungling of the issue on mandarin standards. He made a bold move by expressing his desire to contest without having the candidates to back him up.

Chiam first tried to link up with the Reform Party but had problems when the other members of the SDA refused to accept the terms with which the RP wanted to join the Alliance. It later emerged that Desmond Lim was instrumental in blowing up the whole fiasco. Sin Kek Tong then continued the bad press by publically taking issue with Chiam’s lack of contribution to the party from his MP’s allowance. None of this helped further the SDA’s cause, it was only after leaving the SDA that the SPPs luck turned for the better. As if knights in shining armour the trio of Jimmy Lee, Wilfred Leung, and Benjamin Pwee announced that they would join Chiam in the challenge. Pwee and Lee were both previously government scholars (Pwee was a senior government official), which in Singapore adds extensively to their political credibility. It helped that Pwee belonged to a family of grassroots activist formerly with the PAP in Bishan-Toa Payoh GRC.

SPP’s fortunes took a slight negative turn when Lina Chiam gave a performance to forget in the televised debate on Channel News Asia. Perhaps because of Vincent Wijeysingha’s (SDP) spirited debate and Gerald Giam’s (WP) controlled discussion, Lina Chiam was made to look out of her depth. For sure some members of the public lost confidence in the SPP because of the performance, perhaps if the SPP had rectified its CEC to co-op Benjamin Pwee of Jimmy Lee, their performance could have matched WP or SDP.

However SPP managed to protect its campaign by making uplifting announcements such as setting up a special fund and the setting up of special policy committees.

GE 2011

As the hustings entered into full swing, it became apparent that the SPP leadership (Chiam and Lina) had decided that Pwee and Lee would become the main spokespersons for the party. It was these two man who were responding to the comments made by the PAP and it was these two man who were given the most airtime at rallies. Chiam’s campaign was more of the moral support although it was evident that Chiam was the leader in spirit. Chiam was the inspiration behind the successful run of the SPP in Bishan-Toa Payoh GRC and Potong Pasir GRC.

The party’s performance in Hong Kah North SMC was forgettable, with the PAP opponent Dr Amy Khor ending up as best winning candidate of the whole elections. Much can be attributed to the fact that SPP’s natural location is nowhere near Hong Kah North SMC and its candidate did not excite the populace.

Post GE

SPP will be able to keep itself in the public eye because of the NCMP position by Lina Chiam. It is probably not surprising that Benjamin Pwee has been selected to be in charge of drafting parliamentary speeches, and one can expect that all Lina Chiam says in parliament will be the words of Pwee. A cynic would sardonically comment that Pwee is the puppet master and Lina the puppet (no offence is intended by the writer on this point). Nonetheless, what has become clear is that Pwee will eventually be a leader of the party, and already his presence has seen (if the news is to be believed) some qualified people offer themselves as possible candidates for the next election.

The SPP websites indicates that the SPP is now looking for a headquarters, perhaps strangely enough, some 15 years after its founding. Better late than never one would guess.

Commentary

With the loss of Potong Pasir SMC, Singapore bids farewell to its longest serving opposition MP. Perhaps this was coming all the time. Until the appearance of Benjamin Pwee, Wilfreud Leung and Jimmy Lee the party did not seem to have any form of succession plan and looked to be purely a vehicle for Chiam to run for elections. The party would be better off focusing its efforts in Bishan Toa-Payoh GRC for the next elections, since Hong Kah North SMC would be too far from its base of support and Potong Pasir SMC would in all probability be wiped off the electoral map for the next elections.

Chiam and Low Thia Khiang (WP) could provide a very interesting case study on how to run a political party. What was it that allowed the WP to grow which did not allow the SPP to grow? Was it the political nous and street smarts of the businessman Low or was it that Chiam was unable to go beyond the personality politics of the generation past. SPP would do well to take a leaf from WP’s books and study how to come back stronger in the next elections

One obvious lack that the SP suffers from is the of minority candidates; this is an issue that the SPP seems to be addressing with its policy committees. Another issue that the SPP needs to address is how to build up its party image, considering that it does not have a very clear party manifesto and ideology.

In the NSP analysis it was mentioned that the SDP and NSP had spoken about merger, it would seem that NSP and SPP are much better partners for merger. Both sides were campaigning in regions relatively close to each other and because of a similarly blank canvass of ideologically(allowing them to paint it together) – ‘absolute power corrupts absolutely’ is neither an ideology nor a good long term platform -  they would meet less stumbling blocks than an alliance with SDP would allow.

Introduction

Part One – The Worker’s Party

Part Three – Singapore Democratic Party

Part Four – People’s Action Party

Post GE 2011 Analysis – Part Two: Singapore Democratic Party

Pre GE

The Singapore Democratic Party had the most outstanding online campaign; Its short videos such as “Time for Change” and “SDP loves Singapore” especially caught the eye. This would be definite vote-getters if political parties could buy airtime on national Television. This closest any other party came to competing with the quality of short videos put up was the WP’s “For People. For Nation. For Future.”

In the build up to the elections, SDPs trump card was a certain Dr Vincent Wijeysingha whose claim to fame was his father Eugene (a popular ex-principal of Raffles Institution). Dr Wijeysingha was to come into his own in the elections through the force of his personality and his powerful and emotive rally speeches. His appearance in the national forum caught many Singaporeans by surprise, who found his lively and dynamic challenges to the then Finance Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam either refreshing or rude. SDP’s campaign revolved around the Dr Wijeysingha until the appearance of Tan Jee Say and Dr Ang Yong Guan. The presence of the latter two was in some sense a lucky break for the SDP especially after the “Gay Agenda episode” that then Minister for Community Development Youth and Sports Dr Vivian Balakrishnan insinuated. While many were revolted by the low blow from the medical doctor, others were turned away from voting for the SDP because of prejudice against Dr Wijeysingha as a result of the incident. The presence of Tan and Dr Ang, helped to neutralise this. Tan was a professed Christian who acknowledged that his entrance to politics was pushed by his impression that the PAP had lost its moral compass. Dr Ang and Tan through their Curriculum Vitaes provided the SDP with an air of respectability that previous lawsuits against the party had diminished.

The SDP was also possibly the first party in releasing its alternative economic policy, although this was not given very much airtime. Its manifesto “The SDP solutions” was overshadowed by the SDP’s 10 promises. This caused many to see the 10 promises as the same as the SDP solutions, and it hence seemed to be a weak response to the PAP’s colourful and WP’s detailed manifestos. Had the SDP played up its manifesto, it would have had a first mover advantage – first of forcing the PAP to engage it, second increasing its time in the media before the elections.

GE 2011

The most memorable rally that the SDP had was its lunchtime rally in the city. This was an important way of catching an audience that would come to form an important voting bloc in the current elections and future elections. The simple fact that the SDP rally drew more people than the PAP rally in the same location 2 days before said a lot about its draw. Even though the rally site was located in Tanjong Pagar GRC the symbolism of the rally site was that its target audience was businesses, it was a way for political parties to show that they had concrete proposals for the economy and were not afraid to bring them to the heart of business in Singapore. At the same time, the SDP claimed for itself a sensible first mover advantage in Tanjong Pagar GRC for the coming elections. For the many parties that did not rent this slot, it was a missed opportunity.

SDP was given a lot of support by the online media, this was especially important for it considering the supposed ‘smear campaigns’ waged against it by the traditional media sources. This online defence helped neutralise the bad press (or no press) that it received in the main news sources.

One mistake that the SDP made was in its calls for a televised debate with the PAP. Then Health Minister Khaw Boon Wan explained why the SDP called for it “because they have not done ground work”. The SDP was silent on this, and this is obviously something the SDP needs to work on in future elections.

SDP’s GE results were relatively good, a jump to 36% for Alec Tok in Bukit Panjang up from the previous low of 23% and a similar jump for the group in Sembawang GRC, a similar percentage of votes for Yuhua SMC and almost 40% of the valid votes in Holland-Bukit Timah GRC.

Post GE

SDP’s online activity continues to be the most active of any political party. A cursory look at its main website shows that they have continued to post news items on its activities and views. The SDP could consider a policy education series using its superior online presence (now rivalled by WP[1]) to maintain its presence and brush up its credentials as a credible party.

In print though, the SDP has not seen much news on it, as can be expected. Its greatest attempt would be to grant interviews and call press conferences on its own terms to allow its name to be placed in the traditional media.

Commentary

The relative victory of the SDP despite previous years of attacks in the print media has proved the success of its online engagement. The fact that the SDP managed to win a respectable average cannot be understated, this was the same party that won a paltry 23% of the popular vote when the rest of the opposition parties in Singapore won at least 33% in the 2006 elections. One potential problem that the SDP needs to overcome though is its appearance as catering to the English speaking elite[2]. Most of its candidates were obviously not comfortable in speaking their mother tongues, and the SDP themselves conceded that the vote in Holland-Bukit Timah GRC was lost because the SDP could not win over the lower-middle class mother tongue speaking voters. Its candidate in Yuhua SMC, Teo Soh Lung could have gained even more votes if she was more fluent in mandarin, one positive though was that despite her difficulties in speaking mandarin she managed to collect even more votes than Yip Yew Weng (NSP) and Sin Kek Tong (SPP), this is good evidence of the quality of the SDP brand.

In order to shore up the SDP brand, it is vital that SDP recruit into its ranks accomplished PR people. The way in which party propaganda is conducted will be vital in the intervening years. One possibility would be for the SDP to call for press conferences regularly with their views and challenges to current policy, doing so would allow the SDP to be seen as a responsible party with concrete alternatives and to get it in the news regularly. Rights and freedoms are important to people, but this is something Singaporeans have been indoctrinated out of being interested in. The SDP’s continual focus on these rights while consistent to its principles must be tempered with practical issues. Simply put, if the people are asleep to their political rights, you don’t pour cold water on them to wake them up; you gently prod them until they rouse from their slumber.

Dr Chee Soon Juan is still a polarising figure in local politics, although if he is exonerated in the court of the public mind the SDP’s image will soar due to the perceived unfairness dealt to him in previous years. Dr Chee is hence the SDP most powerful ‘weapon’ if managed carefully. If not managed carefully, Dr Chee’s reputation could be the spear that thrusts into the heart of SDP and halts its development.

SDP has another challenge that is must change. A read into the party’s manifesto shows an anti-PAP streak stronger than its pro-Singapore image. It conjures up images of a party of angry people joining the party out of hatred for the PAP than of love for the SDP and Singapore. This may not be the reality, but in order to convince Singaporeans to give it a chance, the party must play up its pro-Singapore credentials and tone down its anti-PAP credentials. It should consider engaging in positive politics, showing how its policies are better for Singapore and how it is ideas a better for Singapore. A party can only be taken seriously if it aims to challenge the existing government because it feels it can do a better job, being a conduit for people to give vent against the PAP will not help the SDP in becoming a serious alternative.

As mentioned in the segment on the WP, SDP will have a much harder time trying to get into government because its basic ideology has a wider gap from the PAP than the WP does. If it improves in its image as a serious party, then it is highly possible that it could be a coalition partner in a WP led government. Like the Liberal Democrats in the UK, being government outside a coalition would be a further step yet.

Introduction

Part One – The Worker’s Party

Part Three – Singapore People’s Party and National Solidarity Party

Part Four – People’s Action Party


[1] The SDP has fewer eyes but a more responsive online presence, in contrast to the WP which has more viewers on its Facebook pages but is slower responding to online activity.

[2] For the optimist, the SDP can take comfort from the fact that this was the exact same image that the early PAP had when it first tried to make inroads into parliament.